

Реалістична традиція може виправити частину цієї теоретичної незручності, запропонувавши два шляхи теоретизування з «історією»: на рівні одиниці, де історія лежить в основі наявних змінних, або системно, коли історія впливає на міжнародне середовище, в якому діють держави. Обидва шляхи можуть протікати через безліч різних концептуалізацій історії, заснованої на ширшій філософії історії – як об'єктивного факту, як індивідуального досвіду або як інтерсуб'єктивного оповідання. Справді, багато в чому історія є найнижчим спільним знаменником теоретичних підходів у дисципліні міжнародних відносин.

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IGNORING THE SIGN: THE PROBLEM WITH THE IRRESPONSIVE WEST

Анотація. У цій статті стверджується, що було три критичних моменти, після яких Росія ставала все більш амбітною. Це російсько-грузинська війна, російсько-українська війна (2014), російська інтервенція в Сирії. Нерішучість Заходу у реакції на ці події була головним фактором, який запевняв Росію, що вони не понесе жодних наслідків, незважаючи на свою агресію. А потім був четвертий момент, есе Путіна про Україну 2021 р., яке Захід повністю проігнорував. Путін цим есе дуже чітко висловив свій світогляд.

Ключові слова: Росія, Сирія, відповідь Заходу, Україна.

Abstract. This paper argues that there were three critical moments after which Russia got more and more ambitious. These are the Russo-Georgian war, the Russo-Ukrainian war (2014), and the Russian intervention in Syria. The hesitance of the West to react to these events was the main factor that assured Russia that they would not bear any consequences despite their aggressions. And then there was the fourth moment, Putin's essay on Ukraine in 2021, which the West totally ignored. Putin, with his essay, made his worldview very clear.

Keywords: Russia, Syria, West's response, Ukraine.

The recent war in Ukraine has fundamentally shifted the dynamics of the international order. One can say we now live in a post-post-Cold War era. There are discussions over why Russia was able to initiate a full-scale war on the border of Europe [1; 2; 5; 8].

The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate the relation between the irresponsible stance of the West since 2008 and the ever-increasing aggression of Russia, which finally led to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as to analyze the irresponsible West as a problem of the world order. This paper argues that there were three critical moments after which Russia got more and more ambitious. These are the Russo-Georgian war, the Russo-Ukrainian war (2014), and the Russian intervention in Syria [4].

The hesitance of the West to react to these events was the main factor that assured Russia that they would not bear any consequences despite their aggressions. And then there was the fourth moment, Putin's essay on Ukraine in 2021, which the West totally ignored. Putin, with his essay, made his worldview very clear. Yet, the West still failed to see what was coming. From the findings, it is clear that the current world order is in danger if the West continues on its old path. The research argues that the problem of the current liberal international order is not just those that are constantly trying to undermine it, but rather, the most capable, like the West, that hesitates to take action against them [8; 9].

Dissatisfied actors have existed in any kind of order, yet the stability of that order solely depends on those that should safeguard its components [10].

If the West continues on this path, it is good to say that the world order that the West is trying to build is doomed.

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UKRAINE-GEORGIA BILATERAL RELATIONS SINCE THE RESTORATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Анотація. Дві геополітично цікаві та високо ціновані для безпеки та стабільності Чорноморського регіону держави – Україна та Грузія – мають двосторонні відносини з 1992 року, незважаючи на те, що соціокультурні зв'язки заклали свою основу ще в середньовіччі. Наступний аналіз зосереджується на основних пріоритетах українсько-грузинського стратегічного партнерства: торгівлі, безпеці, євроатлантичній інтеграції та двосторонніх відносинах.

Ключові слова: Україна, Грузія, двосторонні відносини, євроатлантична інтеграція.

Abstract. Geopolitically interesting and heavily valued two states for the security and stability of the Black sea Region – Ukraine and Georgia enjoy bilateral relations since 1992 even though socio-cultural links have laid their foundation in medieval centuries. Following analysis focuses on the prime priorities for Ukraine-Georgian strategic partnership: Trade, Security, Euro-Atlantic integration and laps in bilateral relations.

Keywords: Ukraine, Georgia, bilateral relations, Euro-atlantic integration.

Geopolitically interesting and heavily valued two states for the security and stability of the Black sea Region – Ukraine and Georgia enjoy bilateral relations since 1992 even though socio-cultural links have laid their foundation in medieval centuries. Following analysis focuses on the prime priorities for Ukraine-Georgian strategic partnership: Trade, Security, Euro-Atlantic integration and laps in bilateral relations.

Regarding having the common past – being a part of the Soviet Union and having fought for an independence; being invaded by the Russian federation and launching it's occupation policy as well as spreading it's soft-power tools – intensive disinformation and propaganda; being promised by the West and urged for paving the way towards Euro-atlantic integration and being highly dependent on the United States' support in terms of security; progressing the Ukraine-Georgian relations side by side is crucially important, so the analysis will synthesize descriptive and analytical methods in order to suggest a precise explanation of the certain relationship and evaluate its importance for the common duty – counterbalancing Russian influence in the region [2].

First part of the work identifies major trade ties and areas between Georgia and Ukraine as well as the value of Georgia for Ukraine as a transport corridor and value of Ukraine for Georgia as a role model for the involvement in the Three Seas Initiative [1]. Next paragraph is dedicated to cooperation through the Security sphere demonstrating common military exercises in the Black Sea region, bilateral defense agreement which enables bilateral military cooperation and exchange of lessons