

the bank's U.S.-based investments and precluded numerous Russian banks from using SWIFT¹, an inter-bank messaging platform premised in Belgium. The selling of securities in Russia has also been blocked by sanctions imposed by the US Treasury Department on two significant Russian banks. Also, Washington has sequestered the personal assets it holds for sanctioned Russians, including President Vladimir Putin. Regarding energy, the US has also worked to limit Russia's capacity to make money from the sale of oil. Washington limited U.S. participation in the majority of Russian energy corporations in March 2022 and outlawed the importation of Russian oil products, liquefied natural gas, and coal. The United States and its Group of Seven (G7) partners reached an agreement on a cap in December of that year with the objective of keeping the price of Russian crude oil at \$60 per barrel or less. The United States is still importing Russian uranium and has so far refrained from imposing sanctions on Russia's nuclear energy industry. In 2021, Russia will contribute 14 % of American uranium imports. In terms of military technology, to limit Russia's military capabilities, the United States Commerce Department has imposed limits on the transfer of high-tech goods, including semiconductors and aviation equipment, to that country. Even products made by other nations employing US technology are subject to export limitations [2].

Along with the European Union and other allies, the US has put these sanctions into effect. The EU's sanctions against Russian energy have been the most divisive, despite the bloc's own penalties against Russian banks and people, notably Putin. Almost 40 % of the gas and over a third of the oil products used by the EU were supplied by Russia at the moment of the invasion. Others of the members were much more dependent on Russian energy; Hungary imported almost 85 % of its gas and 65 % of its oil products. Because of this dependency, EU efforts to forbid the purchase of Russian gas have faltered in the face of rising energy costs and resistance from Hungary as well as other nations. Nevertheless, the EU placed a restriction on imports of the majority of Russian crude oil in 2022 and accepted the G7 price ceiling; in early 2023, it added a second ban on Russian processed petroleum products including gasoline and diesel [2].

Have Russian sanctions from the West failed, and why? Early predictions for 2022 showed that the Russian economy was in freefall and about to implode, with some experts projecting that the GDP would fall by 7–8 % in a single year. In reality, the decline was just approximately 2,5 %. The IMF projects a modest 0,3 % growth in the GDP for this year. There are obvious signs of underlying economic weakness, even though things aren't as bad as they may be: real wages are decreasing, consumer spending is declining, and inflation hit 11,5 % in January. By selling commodities like gasoline, coal, oil, etc. and collaborating with OPEC to export its oil, Russia has managed to retain commerce with other nations like China during the conflict, which has eventually aided in the survival of their economy. In contrast, when prices soared in the second quarter of 2022, Russian income from fossil fuels reached \$1,08 billion per

¹ SWIFT – The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, often known as S.W.I.F.T. SC, is a cooperative organization based in Belgium that offers services for the implementation of financial transactions as well as payments among banks all over the globe.

day. This month, that is anticipated to drop to about \$560 million per day, but it still represents a sizable source of income. Even now, several Western companies are still functioning in Russia almost a year later, and some are even helping the military effort. Consider Raiffeisen Bank International in Austria and UniCredit in Italy, both of which claim to be considering a departure despite making large profits in Russia. According to a Reuters report on February 13, they are also giving loan payment breaks to Russian military personnel fighting in Ukraine on government orders. Notwithstanding their discontent, the European Central Bank, its Ukrainian equivalent, and several investors show no signs of departing the nation [5].

Although it is clear that the sanctions have a negative effect on the Russian economy, the harm has not yet been sufficient to put a stop to the conflict. There are other reasons than only the lack of sanctions against Russian oil and gas exports in the early phases of the struggle, and we need to take a deep look for these other reasons.

As Smith et al. (2016) suggests financial sanctions make sense as an instrument for foreign policy in a very simple way. Economic hardship is imposed on the target nation in an effort to force political reform. Economic hardship may directly compel the intended nation to alter its policies. Alternately, it could cause political rifts within the administration that force changes in policy, or it might inspire the afflicted target audience to exert pressure on the government for changes in policy or even in the administration itself. These political repercussions are more likely to be felt as financial pressure increases. The problem of amplifying economic suffering is the first obstacle that sanctioners must overcome. Governments that are subject to economic sanctions may occasionally choose to work with different economic partners, even at great political and financial expense. The second concern is that, even when severe economic hardship is imposed, the intended political reforms may not always result. Sanctions, in fact, often have the opposite effect of what is intended. The application of sanctions may instead result in political integration inside the target country rather than domestic political chaos and the collapse of the target regime. The rally-around-the-flag effect is sometimes used to describe how sanctions make the people of the target nation feel more united as a result of what they perceive – or how oppositional leaders portray – as an external threat to or attack on the nation [2].

Now, we need to concentrate on the first point, according to which sanctioned governments can work with other nations, and by doing so, they can make sanctions unsuccessful. China has established itself as one of the world's major producers of goods including electronics, drones, and automobile parts and has proven to be a hugely important economic partner for Russia. Theoretically, Beijing has not sided with either side in the conflict. Yet, China has intervened to provide Russia with enormous quantities of goods that both citizens and the military forces may utilize, including raw materials, cellphones, automobiles, and computer chips, alongside nations like Turkey and certain old Soviet republics [4]. Because of this, a year into the conflict, the Russian economy remains stagnating but unharmed. Full access to sought Western consumer goods and imports of cutting-edge technology, such transistors, has been cut off for the nation. But, people and businesses from all over the globe have jumped into offering Russia cheaper knockoffs of these identical things created in Beijing or others.

With the invasion of Ukraine a year ago, Western countries put on a united front. The Russian economy has clearly been negatively impacted by broad sanctions in some respects, but in others, Moscow has been able to protect itself and withstand some of the repercussions. There are still concerns about how long this predicament may persist. There are no immediate signs that the fighting in Ukraine will end. Large-scale restrictions may eventually continue to devastate the Russian economy and make it harder for Putin to finance his armed retribution. The impacts of a rally might also fade fast. Four years in a row saw a persistent decline in support for Russian leadership following the 2014 and 2015 interventions in Syria and Crimea. The intended effects of Western sanctions may possibly become clearer if a similar pattern continues over the next years [5].

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СУПЕРЕЧЛИВІСТЬ АНТИРОСІЙСЬКИХ САНКЦІЙ ІЗ БОКУ ФІФА

Ключові слова: ФІФА, політика, Росія, Україна, війна.

Keywords: FIFA, policy, Russia, Ukraine, war.

24 лютого 2022 р. війська РФ розпочали повномасштабний наступ на територію України. Війна зачепила всі сфери суспільного життя, не оминувши й сегмент спорту. Особливо сильно від бойових дій постраждав саме футбол, що вважається найбільш популярним видом спорту не лише в Україні, а й в усьому світі. Міжнародна федерація футболу, ФІФА (*FIFA* від фр. *Fédération internationale de football association*) – організація, що опікується футболом по всій земній кулі, не могла оминати таку подію, адже у своїй політиці вона часто орієнтується на позицію міжнародного політикуму, що задає тон порядку денного.

Політична діяльність ФІФА у розрізі російсько-українських відносин бере початок у 2014 р. Саме тоді анексія Криму змусила ФІФА проводити більш обережну політику відносно Росії та України. ФІФА зуміла досягти необхідного балансу, продовжуючи діалог з кожною з держав під час гібридного протистояння між ними. Попри всі геополітичні трансформації, що відбулися з того часу, як Росія вперше порушила територіальну цілісність та суверенітет України, у ФІФА не квапились запроваджувати якісь серйозні санкції щодо агресора. Вра-