

Основними напрямками радянського андеграунду були: соц-арт і концептуальне мистецтво та ін. Після розгрому виставки в Манежі в 1962 р, художники «Нереалісти» йдуть у підпілля, елементами їхньої повсякденності стають квартирні виставки, а також спроби вивезти свої твори на захід. Апогеєм протистояння влади і нонконформістів стала Бульдозерна виставка 1974 г., що отримала широкий резонанс в західних ЗМІ. Після 1974 г. починається масовий вихід художників за межі СРСР.

Отже, ми бачимо, що андеграунд як неофіційне, підпільне мистецтво зародилось на Заході як противага всьому мейнстімному та офіційному. Творчість митців у цей період була причиною суспільно-політичних змін, ідейних утисків та деформацією мистецьких понять і є закономірним явищем.

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THE PHENOMENON OF ORANGE REVOLUTION AS AN EXAMPLE OF “NEW” UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

The aim of the study is to examine the nature of Ukrainian nationalism emerged during and after Orange Revolution in 2004. The essay involves a historical overview of the term «nationalism» in Ukrainian public debate as well as the essence of Ukrainian nationalism in modern Ukraine.

Keywords: *Nationalism, Orange revolution, Ukraine, nationalists.*

Definition of the Ukrainian nationalism can be examined from very different perspectives in regard to the historical time-frame, region or even the interpretation of the term «nationalism» itself. During Ukraine being either divided between Russian Empire and Austrian Empire, or as a part of USSR; after the WWII or after gaining independence in 1991, the term «nationalism» can be understood in various ways. On the first meeting of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1995 the interpretation given was:

«When it comes to nationalism, different people put their own meaning into this concept. Some say about "democratic" nationalism, some – about "integral". Some emphasize the so-called "liberal" nature of nationalism; some say "authoritarian". We will use only one definition of nationalism – Ukrainian» [2, 41].

Taking into account numerous Ukrainian nationalist organizations that emerged during XIX-XX centuries, they sometimes not considered as separate

concepts, but as a part of single Ukrainian nationalist movement. Part of Ukrainian nationalist discourse also includes debates about Ukrainian nationalist organizations like UPA, which were responsible for the atrocities such as massacres of Jews and Poles, perpetrated under the mottos of defending Ukrainian national idea. So, to give a more proper framework of Ukrainian nationalism, we should refer to analysis made by the scholar of modern nationalism Peter Alter, who suggested that Ukrainian nationalism did not exist as a single, coherent phenomenon. Various Ukrainian nationalisms emerged and operated in different periods of modern Ukrainian history; sometimes were led by the set of common principles and ideas, but often opposed and contradicted each other. For example, the central idea of Ukrainian nationalism (if consider it as a single phenomenon) was the creation of nation state. But we can argue, that a single, universal "project" of the Ukrainian nation and statehood did not exist. It is possible to identify at least four models of the nation made by the Ukrainian intelligentsia: the populist (M. Hrushevsky), the conservative-elitist (V. Lipinsky), the totalitarian (D. Dontsov, theorists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and class socialist (Ukrainian socialists and national-Communists). Each of these concepts corresponded to the model of the state structure of the Ukrainian nation. So it's difficult to unanimously state if it should be considered as variants of Ukrainian nationalism, or as different Ukrainian nationalisms [1, 13].

The term "nationalism" appears in Ukrainian journalism in the 80's and 90's of the nineteenth century [6, 248]. First, this term was used not for the designation of a concrete political doctrine, but for a rather broad circle of socio-political ideas and preferences of Ukrainians. For example, Boris Hrinchenko – Ukrainian writer and activist (among others) – in "Letters from Dnieper Ukraine" distinguishes among Ukrainian activists "formal nationalists" who "show affection to all Ukrainian: to the Ukrainian language, to Ukrainian literature, even to Ukrainian clothes" and "conscious Ukrainian nation-lovers" or, as was subsequently begun to call them, "nationally conscious" Ukrainians. In the «Dialogue» between B. Hrinchenko and M. Drahomanov (1892-93) on Ukrainian movement problems, "Ukrainian nationalism" was mostly mentioned as an alternative to "chauvinism". At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, the situation has changed: the division of the one Ukrainian national movement into separate rivals and the struggle between them had led to the ideologization and politicization of the concept of "nationalism" [4].

The strong negative connotation with Ukrainian nationalism as a notion was emphasized on the aftermath of the World War II, when Soviet Union used an anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which involved portraying all Ukrainian nationalists as Fascists, regardless it was Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which had collaborated with Nazi Germany during the war, or Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army, which hadn't [7, 342]. After the rapid fall of the Soviet Union Ukrainian nationalist movement had to confront new dilemma – the lack of solely Ukrainian, separate national identity. Taking to account the peaceful dissolution

of the USSR Ukraine didn't have its national heroes or so-called «mythology» [7, 372]. After proclaiming independence, Orange Revolution was, in some sense, one form of manifestation of «new» Ukrainian nationalism. For the first time since December 1991, the Orange Revolution attracted the attention of the entire world community to Ukraine. Theoretical debate on the Ukrainian revolution by domestic and foreign analysts was extremely active.

To understand the phenomenon of Orange Revolution we should focus on the decisive factors that led to the protests of citizens during the 2004 presidential election, and also to try to outline some post-revolutionary civic and state-building tendencies. The formation of a national identity and the establishment of the statehood of the Ukrainian people are measured over hundreds of years. These processes were accompanied by the stubborn struggle of many generations of patriots (whom we can call nationalists), which allowed Ukrainians to preserve their ethnic self-sufficiency and national-cultural identity. In the modern age, the priority task for the young Ukrainian statehood is the transformation of the old bureaucratic administrative apparatus of power – which in its structure was almost identical with feudal absolutism – to a democratic form of social organization.

Since the Orange Revolution took place under the slogans of the Ukrainian revival, it was an expression of Ukrainian nationalism. However, it should be noted – not in the sense of the direct consequence of the organized nationalist movement, but as a manifestation of the collective instinct, which can be explained as when nation unites and «sorts things out» when feels the threat to its progress. On the West, such actions were enthusiastically qualified as "direct actions of democracy", when people protest against officials they don't support and as a consequence actually dismiss them from work. The mutation of the Soviet totalitarian regime on the territory of sovereign Ukraine caused a system-wide crisis, in which the clan-oligarchic, criminal-authoritarian model of state administration, was the main factor in deterring society on the way of further socio-economic and political development.

Numerous factors testified that Ukraine proved to be unable to adequately answer most of the challenges of the present. This led to the formation of a revolutionary situation that required a revolutionary breakthrough. In modern times radical socio-political transformations take place in the form of "velvet revolutions" that carry creative, life-affirming beginning; they are surrounded by a halo of festivity and bloodless finale. Such were the Velvet Revolution in 1989 in Czechoslovakia, the Singing Revolution in Estonia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003. Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine was one of them. Such revolutions can also be considered anti-communist, since they eliminate such relics of the communist era as the administrative corruption, that prevailed in Ukraine after the collapse of communism. Nationalism was basically the driving force of the revolution as Ukrainian identity was understood to be under threat.

"We, citizens of Ukraine, – Victor Yushchenko emphasized in his speech, – have become the only Ukrainian nation. We cannot be divided either in the

languages we speak, in the beliefs we confess, in the political views that we choose. We have one Ukrainian fate. We have one Ukrainian pride. We are proud that we are Ukrainians» [9].

If we try to formulate the definition of the Ukrainian revolution, then it is expedient to use the statements of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who foresaw the collapse of the "empire of evil" and the independence of Ukraine. Regarding the revolutionary events in Ukraine, he states: "We are witnessing a kind of dramatic marriage between Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian democracy, a dramatic combination of Ukrainian patriotism, Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian democracy, liberty, liberalism»[3, 46].

The changes that came after the second round of the 2004 elections can be called the Revolution of the Ukrainian Spirit. In addition to the traditional struggle for power, the recent Ukrainian revolution had actualized the issue of existential nature, namely: the choice of a political perspective, the search for a new national idea, a modern Ukrainian identity, and a better format for state development [3, 46]. Two important issues need to be distinguished here: the absence of the nationalist forces in the active Ukrainian politics and, in addition, the presence of a slogan of national revival. If we want to «revive” something, then, by definition, it must be already gone. The questions are – was it gone in Ukraine and what happened to Ukrainian nationalists? After the proclamation of independence in 1991, the regimes of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, during the thirteen years of stagnation, deepened (post) colonial status of Ukraine. Nationalists have joined the struggle in new, now peaceful conditions, creating a variety of alternative structures – political parties and civic organizations, appealing in a grand propaganda campaign to the broader masses with a minimal presence on the media market. The fundamental principle of Ukrainian nationalism – "self-reliance" – is correlated with Western standards and the notion of "civil society" [5]. This principle is traditionally used to describe the control of the state system by the people. After all, in any system the state possesses as much rights as society allows it to. In this case it was not about control of the state. The struggle of the nation continued to oppose a hostile system and accordingly support the proper Ukrainian state, which was a manifestation of the highest idealistic standards. So, Ukrainian society was confronted with two alternatives: either reject the newly proclaimed state they fought for, or to support a clearly anti-Ukrainian and frankly predatory system. The latter was successfully used by both national-democratic and nationalist movements for their own legitimation. Instead of political competition – the dominance of outdated anti-imperial rhetoric; instead of the struggle for power – demagoguery; instead of solving urgent issues that stirred the nation, – an appeal to the heroism of the 1920s and 1950s.

After the 2004 revolution, the western and central parts of Ukraine gained a political national identity, which served as the basis for its civilian essence in these regions. At the same time, the south and east of the country felt unnecessary without seeing their own prospects in the "orange project." In spite of the general

opinion, the development of nationalism and the manifestation of national identity began in the south and east, which opened a new discussion on the notion of Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainian political arena in the first decades of newly emerged Ukrainian state can be characterized by the division of political parties onto either «pro-Russian» or «nationalistic». Allegedly «pro-Russian» presidential candidate Kuchma in 1994 winning the elections against his «nationalistic» rival Kravchuk with 51 to 45 percent of votes; decade later «nationalistic» candidate Yushchenko winning against «pro-Russian» Yanukovich edging out his opponent by 8 percent (52 to 44). Comparing the vote tendencies during both elections the major shift in public consciousness had happened in central Ukraine [8, 24].

One of the greatest achievements of the Orange Revolution is the beginning of the publication of political processes in Ukraine. Given the relative impartiality of the media, the important task of post-revolutionary state-building was to develop political consciousness and legal culture of citizens through the propagation of national values, the revival of state values, the implementation of an active patriotic policy discourse [3, 49]. There have been radical transformations in the public consciousness, as well as mental and value orientations of citizens. What was considered as declarative symbols, the ideas of freedom and social justice, market and democracy was filled with new content, pushing the vital material needs to the forefront of the value hierarchy. The events of November-December 2004 catalyzed the process of becoming a civil society in Ukraine.

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Секція 4. Образи минулого: історична пам'ять та колективна ідентичність

Драчук Юлія

ФЕНОМЕН ЖІНКИ В ІСЛАНДСЬКІЙ САГОВІЙ ТРАДИЦІЇ

Ця стаття досліджує ісландські родові саги як один з головних джерел жіночої історії скандинавського суспільства X–XI століть. Основна увага зосереджена на аналізі таких саг: Сага про Ейріка Рудого, Сага про Ньяла, Сага про синів Дроплауг, Сага про Гіслі, Сага про людей з Лососевої долини, Сага про Хьорд і острів'янах.

Ключові слова: *вікінги, ісландські саги, гендерна історія, жіноча історія, жінка.*

This article explores the Icelandic tribal saga as one of the main sources of women's history of the Scandinavian society of the X – XI centuries. The main attention concentrates on the analysis of such sagas: Saga of Erik the Red, Njals saga, Droplaugarsona saga, Gisli Saga, Laxdale Saga, Harðar saga ok Hólmverja.

Keywords: *Vikings, Icelandic Sagas, gender history, women's history, women.*

Доба вікінгів (VIII–XI ст.) цікавить не тільки неймовірними темпами, військової експансії, мирної колонізації та успішним розвитком «торгової імперії», а й особливостями міжгендерних відносин у тогочасному суспільстві. Щоб краще зрозуміти цей аспект соціального